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GODTALK: SHOULD RELIGION INFORM 
PUBLIC DEBATE? 
J. David Bleich* 
As a child, knee-high to a grasshopper, I heard a Yiddish maxim 
from my grandmother. It wasn't really a maxim but an admonition, 
and in translation it runs as follows: "If, when traveling in a coach 
and wagon, the coachman drives past the door of a church and fails 
to cross himself, get out immediately!" My grandmother, and others 
of a bygone age to whom this rule was virtually self-evident, were not 
making a pronouncement of theological significance. That admonition 
had nothing to do with theology and everything to do with safety and 
survival. They simply did not trust a person who was irreligious, and 
that distrust was well founded. Voltaire, a doctrinaire atheist himself, 
believed that atheism was safe only for intellectuals. He is reported 
to have said, "I want my lawyer, tailor, valet, even my wife, to believe 
in God. I think that if they do I shall be robbed less and cheated 
less." 
My problem: As I ride in a bus passing the National Cathedral 
in Washington, the bus driver does not cross herself. Indeed, were 
she· to cross herself, I am sure that on the morrow a suit would be 
filed by the American Civil Liberties Union accompanied by an 
amicus brief by the American Jewish Congress claiming that the 
driver's conduct constitutes an infringement of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment because the bus driver is, after all, a 
government employee, and the bus is indeed government property. 
But the driver's failure to cross herself is not really my problem. 
After all, I could refrain from using public transportation; indeed, in 
New York City, many residents have rejected public transportation, 
albeit for other reasons. My problem is much more basic. My 
problem is that of the man who takes a fall and proceeds to consult 
a physician. The doctor examines him, ascertains that there are no 
broken bones, and tells the gentleman, "Forget about the fall. I want 
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to know why you fell." I am not so much concerned about the fact 
that the bus driver does not cross herself; I am concerned about why 
the driver would consider crossing herself to constitute inappropriate 
behavior. 
Why is the introduction of religion into the public square 
regarded as inappropriate and almost an embarrassment? Our society 
tends to equate legality with morality. That which is legal is ipso 
facto moral; only that which is illegal is immoral. Moreover, we live 
in a society in which any constitutionally protected liberty is regarded 
as a social imperative. The exercise of that liberty becomes, if I may 
use the term, a mitzvah in the religion of secular humanism. 
Examples: Friends serving in the pulpit rabbinate have told me 
that, on occasion, when they have wished to deny their pulpits to 
individuals such as the late Meir Kahane, they have been told by 
congregants that, in the United States, there is an absolute right to 
freedom of speech. Those well-meaning but misguided individuals are 
not totally ignorant of the fact that the First Amendment serves only 
as an impediment to government action but neither mandates nor bars 
action in the private sphere. They are, however, convinced that any 
form of expression that is immune from governmental interference is 
deserving of encouragement. 
The same type of confusion manifests itself in the abortion 
debate. Abortion, in many circles, is regarded as an entitlement. The 
line of reasoning seems to be as follows: The Supreme Court has 
ruled that legal barriers to abortion constitute a violation of a 
woman's right to privacy and has affirmed a woman's right to do with 
her body as she chooses. Ergo, public policy should encourage her to 
regard termination of a pregnancy as a morally neutral act and society 
ought to facilitate her ability to secure an abortion. The liberties and 
constraints enshrined in the Bill of Rights become not simply 
limitations of governmental authority but societal mandates. The 
elementary distinction between governmental interference in personal 
freedoms and societal promotion of moral values has, in the minds of 
many, become blurred beyond recognition. 
Assuredly, history has taught us much regarding the danger of 
permitting religion to dictate public mores. The nature of religion is 
such that adherents of any particular religion often feel that they are 
privy to absolute truth not only regarding matters of theology, but 
also concerning standards of morality and even mundane aspects of 
human conduct. Historically, the result has not infrequently been 
discrimination against, and persecution of, individuals and sects who 
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dissented from the teachings of the politically dominant religious 
group. This country was founded as a haven for victims of religious 
persecution. Tolerance is quite properly a cardinal virtue of demo-
cratic society. But tolerance should extend to all who, in practice, are 
willing to reciprocate; it should not translate itself into intolerance of 
some persons or ideologies because of fear based upon historical 
experience. Long and deeply rooted traditions of freedom and 
individual liberty serve as a powerful shield against domination of any 
stripe. 
Religion is a powerful force in shaping the tastes, desires, and 
aspirations of many-and indeed it should be. Needs and desires 
driven by religious conviction are no less real than those born of other 
impulses; indeed they are likely to be much more intense. Precisely 
because they are intense, they ought to be regarded as privileged 
rather than dismissed as suspect. "To each according to his needs" is 
firmly rooted in utilitarian principles. Maximization of the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number necessitates recognition of intensity 
of individual needs and desires. Individuals intuitively govern their 
actions by such notions without necessarily formulating them as rules. 
A person will instinctively give a spare concert ticket to a friend who 
is a lover of music rather than to one who is simply curious to see the 
inside of the concert hall. Taking the same principle one step further, 
I am perfectly willing to forego a piece of chocolate cake in favor of 
giving it to a child who will relish it far more than I. An employer 
who willingly allows an employee an absence from work because of 
religious observance, but is unsympathetic to a request for an 
afternoon off to attend a ballgame, is not necessarily manifesting 
respect for religion. If astute, the employer recognizes that those 
desires are qualitatively different and call for different responses. In 
the public arena, identification of religious concerns should serve as 
a marker indicating that, even from the vantage point of a utilitarian 
calculus, those concerns deserve enhanced weight. 
Somewhat quixotically, admission of religious debate in the public 
square might serve to mitigate the force of nonreligious arguments 
advanced by religionists. The requirement that it is necessary to 
establish a "secular purpose" in order to justify government action 
results in situations in which the announced secular purpose is, at 
times, an excuse rather than a reason. The religionist will argue the 
merits of the secular purpose with far more rigor than he can accept 
in good conscience, all the while hiding his real concern in pectore. 
Thus, for example, the debate concerning welfare reform is restricted 
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to the mundane, secular pros and cons. There certainly must be 
human beings who simply believe that it is a sin to allow human 
beings to go hungry. I strongly suspect that people opposed to 
welfare reform on grounds that can best be described as theological 
have not remained silent but have chosen to argue their case on 
grounds of social well-being. Pragmatically speaking, that is probably 
the more effective course; for my part, however, I would prefer a full 
and frank dialogue. 
Just a bit more than one hundred years ago, in Church of the 
Holy Trinity v. United States,1 Justice Brewer declared that "this is a 
Christian nation. "2 Today students of constitutional law find that 
statement, if not embarrassing, at least quixotic. But at the time it 
was written, the learned author found no contradiction between that 
pronouncement and the (anti-)Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. At issue before the Court was an anti-immigration 
statute. Toe declaration supported a finding that "[t]he common 
understanding of the terms labor and laborers does not include 
preaching and preachers. "3 Lest anyone assume that members of the 
clergy actually work, the Court found it necessary to add that it would 
be unthinkable to assume that Congress, in enacting an anti-immigra-
tion statute, intended to bar an invitation to Anglican clergy to 
minister to the religious needs of U.S. citizens. 
But the declaration resonates with a more profound meaning. It 
clearly reflects a literal interpretation of the Establishment Clause as 
prohibiting only an established state church but in no way precluding 
governmental preference of religion and religious values. Toe framers 
of the Constitution certainly envisioned a Christian nation, de facto 
if not de jure. Indeed, the Bill of Rights did not at all interfere in the 
ongoing relationship with established religions that then existed in 
nine of the thirteen states. Toe last of these states disestablished 
religion in 1833. Quite to the contrary, the First Amendment was 
designed to prevent the establishment of a national church that would 
effectively supplant the churches established by the various states. As 
a matter of historical fact, the Bill of Rights was made binding upon 
the individual states, rather than upon the federal government 
exclusively, only after the various state churches had long been 
disestablished. 
1. 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
2. Id. at 471. 
3. Id. at 463. 
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In the cultural milieu that we have created, conduct or action that 
would violate constitutional norms if governmental activity were 
involved becomes a violation of socially accepted mores when 
displayed in the public square. Thus the (anti)-Establishment Clause 
in the Bill of Rights is no longer simply a restriction upon government 
conduct but comes to be regarded as a restraint upon public debate, 
ultimately a de facto constraint upon individual conduct. 
I do not at all pretend that the First Amendment is the only 
reason, or even the principal reason, for the lack of religiosity, if I 
may call it such, in American society. Certainly it is not. But it 
seems to me that the First Amendment has made its small contribu-
tion to the creation of an areligious society. I frankly regard the First 
Amendment as a failed experiment. Yet, I hasten to add that I would 
not want to live in a society that does not boast of a First Amend-
ment or a functional equivalent thereof. But the desire for the 
protection afforded by the First Amendment should not prevent us 
from recognizing that neither of its clauses always achieved the effect 
we want. 
The constitutional separation of church and state has clearly 
given rise to a certain embarrassment about the recognition of religion 
and religious values in public affairs. As a result, if a religious 
denomination has strong views on a particular public issue, it may be 
sure that its position will be dismissed as sectarian and hence 
unworthy of serious attention. Values nurtured by religious convic-
tion are to be left at the church or synagogue door; they are not to 
influence or even inform public debate. To paraphrase a Jewish 
writer of the Enlightenment: Be God-fearing in private, but an 
agnostic in public.4 
My own reaction to Justice Brewer's declaration in Church of the 
Holy Trinity is: "Amen. Would that the United States were indeed 
a Christian nation!"5 However, as a Jew who is also a member of a 
law school faculty, I find it necessary to append an "oral law" 
interpretation. The interpretation may be found in the last scene of 
the play Nathan the Wise6 by the German poet Lessing in which 
4. Judah Leib Gordon, Hakitzah Ami, In KITVEI YEHUDAH LEIB GORDON: SHIRAH 
17 (1959). 
5. Holy Trinity , 143 U .S. at 471. 
6. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Nathan der Weise, in LESSING'S NATHAN DER WEISE 
(Sylvester Primer ed., 1906). 
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Nathan is told: "Nathan, Nathan, indeed you are a Christian."7 To 
this Nathan responds by saying, "That which you call a Christian in 
me, I call a Jew in you."8 Or, as Justice Douglas put it succinctly in 
Zorach v. Clausen,9 "We are a religious people whose institutions 
presuppose a Supreme Being."10 To be effective in the public 
square, religion need not, and should not, be sectarian in nature. 
In some sectors of our community, to engage in activity that can 
be regarded, even remotely, as an encroachment upon separation of 
church and state is regarded as sacrilegious; to question the wisdom 
of maintaining a hermetically sealed wall is nothing less than heresy. 
Indeed, at times it would appear that the covenant of Philadelphia has 
supplanted the covenant of Sinai as the credo of American society 
and that the first ten amendments command a devotion far in excess 
of that paid to the Ten Commandments. Modern-day devotees of the 
Constitution would erect impregnable fences around this wall just as 
the Jewish sages of old erected fences around the Law of Moses. 
There is no gainsaying the fact that Jefferson's "wall of separa-
tion" has contributed to an erosion of religious awareness in the 
public life in our country. This was certainly not the intention of the 
Framers of the Constitution. 
The First Amendment . . . does not say that in every and all 
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State .... 
[W]e find no constitutional requirement which makes it 
necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to 
throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope 
of religious influence. 11 
Thus spake a Supreme Court Justice whose credentials as a liberal are 
unimpeachable-Justice William Douglas writing for the majority in 
Zorach. 
It is sometimes forgotten that the First Amendment was intended 
to be binding only upon the federal government, not upon the 
individual states. Matters of religion were to be dealt with by the 
individual states as they saw fit. Indeed, as noted earlier, at the time 
th'at the First Amendment was inscribed to all eternity upon tablets 
of constitutional stone, established churches existed in nine of the 
7, Id, at 169. 
8. Id. 
9. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
10. Id. at 313. 
11. Id. at 312, 314. 
June 1996] GODTALK 1519 
original states. It was not until a Supreme Court decision handed 
down in 1940, Cantwell v. Connecticut,12 that the Bill of Rights was 
held to be binding upon state governments by virtue of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment13 and not until 1947 
in Everson v. Board of Education14 that the Court declared that the 
Establishment Clause applies with equal force to state govern-
ments.15 
Let us put questions of constitutional jurisprudence aside for a 
moment. Do we want Johnny to pray? Do we want teenagers to be 
exposed to the concept of a personal God? Do we want the 
coachman to make the sign of the cross when passing a church? 
"Yes!" comes the response, "but not in school and not on public 
property." Fair enough, until one realizes that: (1) Far too many 
parents are unconcerned with such matters with the result that their 
children do not receive even minimal exposure to experiences that 
might be even remotely categorized as religious; and (2) Studied 
avoidance of all things religious in public contexts may become 
tantamount to the public negation of all religion. In the words of 
Justice Douglas such a result "would be preferring those who believe 
in no religion over those who do believe,"16 a state of affairs quite 
antithetical to the goal the First Amendment was designed to achieve. 
Heaven forfend that these comments be in any way construed as 
advocating the states' right either to engage in religious indoctrination 
or to interfere in the slightest with religious freedom. But we must 
recognize, as did former Chief Justice Burger in Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion,11 that "[n]o perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the 
very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts-one 
that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement." 18 
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof . . .. "19 The Free Exercise Clause prohibits any 
form of religious coercion; the Establishment Clause proscribes 
government endorsement or overt assistance to religious endeavors 
12. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
13. Id. at 303. 
14. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
15. Id. at 14-16. 
16. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314. 
17. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
18. Id. at 670. 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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even were there to be unanimous consent on the part of the populace. 
Everyone agrees that free exercise is, and must remain, an absolute. 
Toe alternative is the loss of religious liberty. 
But it is not at all clear that religious liberty is incompatible with 
even a formal establishment of religion. Toe religious liberty of Jews, 
Moslems, Hindus, Sikhs, and members of various cults and sundry is 
in no way diminished-at least today-in Great Britain by virtue of 
the unique position of the Church of England as the established 
church of the realm. On the contrary, establishment serves to 
mitigate only the freedom of the established church and its communi-
cants which, by virtue of its establishment, is technically subject to the 
whims of Parliament. 
In our country, establishment is unthinkable, not simply because 
of the constitutional prohibition, but because establishment is 
regarded as carrying with it an aura bordering at least on the mildly 
coercive. But there is no need to throw out the baby with the bath 
water. Toe Supreme Court has wisely drawn repeated distinctions 
between "establishment" and "accommodation." The former is 
anathema; the latter commendable. The problem is where to draw 
the line. 
It is certainly difficult to draw a line that will permit the desired 
result but not yield logical inconsistencies that can ultimately 
obliterate the line entirely. Nor should it be forgotten that denial of 
services and benefits for fear of violating the Establishment Clause is 
itself a diminution of the free exercise of religion. In Walz the Court 
sagaciously observed that there is an inherent tension between the 
Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses, "both of which are cast 
in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical 
extreme, would tend to clash with the other. "20 We may wish 
Johnny to pray in school but nevertheless recognize that such a goal 
is constitutionally unattainable. That should not automatically lead 
us to reject moments of silence as, constitutionally speaking, equally 
odious. The challenge is to recognize the goal and to fashion the 
means. Toe goal should be nondiscriminatory encouragement of 
religious activity to the fullest extent possible within the parameters 
of the First Amendment. 
Odd as it may sound, such a policy need not be regarded as at 
variance from the tripartite test of constitutionality adopted by the 
20. Walz , 397 U .S. at 668-69. 
June 1996] GODTALK 1521 
Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.21 Encouragement of 
religious awareness serves a very tangible secular purpose. Let us put 
aside the very real denominational interest in financial support of 
parochial school education. Is it not in the interests of all Americans 
to foster parochial school education for all citizens who wish to avail 
themselves of such an opportunity? Juvenile delinquency and drug 
use are demonstrably far less prevalent among students of those 
schools than among the general teenage population. That represents 
a tangible secular benefit to all Americans. 
In Everson v. Board of Education the Supreme Court declared 
assistance to parochial schools in the form of bus transportation to be 
constitutional on the somewhat tenuous ground that the program was 
designed to assure the safety of children rather than to promote 
religious education.22 In Board of Education v. Allen23 the Court 
permitted the state to provide textbooks of a secular nature for use 
in parochial schools on the grounds that the benefit was to parents 
and children, not to schools.24 Is not a tuition subsidy to defray the 
cost of hiring a teacher of mathematics but the logical and functional 
equivalent of the purchase of secular textbooks? Here, too, the 
benefit is to parents and children, not to religion. As Justice Powell 
stated in Hunt v. McNair,25 "[T]he Court has not accepted the 
recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect 
of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious 
ends."26 
The Supreme Court has indeed long struggled with attempts to 
determine when permissible accommodation rises to the level of 
proscribed establishment. Perhaps at least a partial resolution lies in 
an understanding of the history of the development of First Amend-
ment protection of religion. The originally proposed text of the First 
Amendment, a text not promulgated, read: "The civil rights of none 
shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall 
21. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
religion."' Id. at 612-13. 
22. Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947). 
23. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
24. Id. at 243-44. 
25. 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
26. Id. at 743. 
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any national religion be established."27 The function of the latter 
clause was explicitly limited to preventation of the rise of an institu-
tion in the nature of a national established church to the prejudice of 
denominations not accorded that recognition. The right to institute 
an Established Church-or not to do so-was a right jealously 
preserved to the individual states. The thrust of the proposed text 
was not to bar aid to religion but to bar the preference of one 
denomination over others. Assuredly, it was not designed to render 
the federal government and its institutions areligious in nature. Quite 
apart from original intent, the phrase "establishment of religion" as 
it appears in the text actually adopted, could readily be interpreted as 
ref erring to religious worship, public adoration, ritual, ceremony, and 
the like. In that context, one could readily understand that all forms 
of aid to religion are interdicted by the First Amendment. Even 
Justice Black's formulation in Everson prohibiting "aid [to] one 
religion . . . [or] all religions"28 and "aid," understood-contra 
Douglas-as connoting not simply financial aid but as encompassing 
other forms of aid as well, is sound doctrine with regard to establish-
ment of religion in the sense of worship and other forms of public 
adoration. However, the policy concerns that bar establishment of 
religion in that sense are not directly relevant to the values, principles, 
morals, or even the basic teachings of religion which, in a significant 
sense, are so much more fundamental and so much more important. 
It should also be noted that it was only with some degree of 
reluctance that the Supreme Court came to recognize that religious 
practices other than prayer and similar acts of divine service are 
protected by the First Amendment. Religion for a Protestant, after 
all, is not centered upon ritual observances and restrictions, but is 
fairly well circumscribed by prayer, church attendance, and Bible 
reading. 
Perhaps we should recognize that such a limited understanding 
of the connotation of the term "religion" is not entirely incorrect. 
Accordingly, it may be argued that religion should be understood, 
constitutionally speaking, as a homonym employed with diverse 
connotations in the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. We 
must insist that the Free Exercise Clause is designed to protect 
religious practice in the broadest sense of that term but urge that the 
27. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (emphasis added). 
28. Everson, 330 U .S. at 15. 
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parallel clause prohibiting establishment of religion be regarded as 
limiting governmental entanglement with religion in the narrow sense 
of the term "religion," worship, and overt profession of a creed. This 
semantic point serves to bolster Professor Lawrence Tribe's argument 
that anything "arguably nonreligious" should not be considered 
religious in applying the Establishment Clause.29 
Recognition that the ambit of "religion" proscribed by the 
Establishment Clause is far less encompassing than the ambit 
protected by the Free Exercise Clause certainly comes closer to 
capturing the spirit of the First Amendment than other attempts to 
resolve the tension between the two clauses. In the words of former 
Chief Justice Burger: "[F]or the men who wrote the Religion Clause 
of the First Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted 
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the 
sovereign in religious activity. "30 It did not connote a mandate for 
neutrality between religion and the absence thereof. Nor, as Chief 
Justice Rehnquist has stated, is there anything in the Establishment 
Clause which requires government to be strictly neutral between 
religion and irreligion. On the contrary, as Justice Douglas remarked, 
"When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with 
religious authorities ... it follows the best of our traditions."31 
Strange as it may seem to many lay people, but as students of 
constitutional law would readily concede, the development of First 
Amendment doctrine over the past two hundred years is rooted, not 
in transcendental truth or in the application of esoteric hermeneutical 
principles, but in what the Court perceives to be good for our 
society-surely a matter over which reasonable people may differ. 
The policy that reflects a view of societal welfare that recognizes the 
singular contribution of religion to the betterment of society was 
perhaps best expressed by Chief Justice Burger in Walz: 
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment 
and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will 
not tolerate either governmentally established religion or 
governmental interference with religion. Short of those 
expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for 
play in the j~ints productive of a benevolent neutrality which 
29. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 14-6, at 828 (1978). 
30. Walz, 397 U.S. at 668. 
31. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14. 
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will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship 
and without interference.32 
Read in the manner herein proposed, the First Amendment-or 
better, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment-acquires 
a meaning entirely different from its broad interpretation in scores of 
judicial decisions. Of course, this line of argument will hardly be 
regarded as respectable in academic circles, certainly not within legal 
academic circles. And recognition that this type of advocacy is not 
respectable becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. If one regards a 
certain position as somewhat less than respectable, one does not 
engage in discourse advocating that position. Failure to engage in 
that type of conversation confirms its lack of respectability and the 
wall of separation is thereby reinforced not only as a wall between 
church and state but as a wall between religion and the public square. 
Accordingly, religious concerns, even when introduced into the public 
square, lose their validity. But the converse is also true: Religious 
concerns presented in public discourse again and again dispel 
embarrassment and become self-validating. But in order for religion 
to become present in the public square we must first overcome the 
reticence from which we all suffer. Who knows? Maybe if we 
succeed in overcoming these inhibitions the course of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence might even be reversed or at least modified. 
32. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669. 
